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Plaintiff/Appellant William Rothstein hereby submits this Reply 
Memorandum in further support of his appeal. 
OBSERVATIONS 
In its Memorandum, Snowbird makes ten (10) statements of fact and/or law 
that need to be briefly addressed, commencing with Snowbird's attempt to rewrite 
the legislative history of Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, 
In his opening Memorandum, Rothstein referred the Court to the floor 
debate on the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, which was Senate Bill 146. Specifically, 
Rothstein focused upon the comments of the BilFs sponsor, Senator Finlinson, 
which made clear that the purpose and stated objective of this Law was to reduce 
the liability of ski area operators and regulate the relationship between down hill 
skiers and ski resort/area operators by defining and allocating their respective 
duties of care. In that debate, for example, Senator Finlinson said that while 
Senate Bill 146 would require skiers to assume responsibility for the risks inherent 
in skiing, ski areas and ski operators still had the responsibility to make sure that 
they did not operate in a negligent manner. 
In opposition to this express intent on the part of the Utah Legislature to 
allocate and define the duty of care between downhill skiers and ski resorts, 
Snowbird responds by including in the Addendum to its Memorandum, an August 
8, 2006, Affidavit from former Senator Finlinson. In that Affidavit, Finlinson 
states that the purpose of the Act was not to establish a ski resort - operators' duty 
of care or to protect skiers. Rather, "the intent of and sole driving force behind 
Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act was to help protect ski area operators by 
statutorily immunizing them from liability for risk inherent in the sport of skiing, 
snow-boarding and other related activities." {Finlinson Ajfd, % 4.) Finlinson 
goes on to state in his Affidavit that had the Utah Legislature intended to prohibit 
pre-injury Release Agreements in favor of ski area operators, it would have 
expressly done so. But there are several fatal flaws in Snowbird's use of this 
Affidavit, which Snowbird even calls "secondary evidence" of the Utah 
Legislature's intent in enacting the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. 
To begin with, Snowbird's use of Finlinson's Affidavit is improper since it 
was not part of the record before the District Court. Because that Affidavit is not 
part of the record on appeal, it should not be considered by this Court. See Smith v. 
Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, | 33, 70 P.3d 904. 
Another flaw in Snowbird's proffer of the Finlinson Affidavit is that Finlinson's 
statements, even though sworn, cannot, as a matter of law7, be considered as part of 
the Act's legislative history. 
The law is very clear. Courts cannot look to the testimony of a former 
legislator as part of the legislative history of a statute, nor can Courts consider such 
ex parte views in interpreting a statute. See Sutherland, 2A Statutes and Statutory 
2 
Constructions §§48:16 and 48:17 (6 cd. 2000). That such post enactment 
"evidence" is not part of a statute's legislative history or to be used to interpret a 
law is not surprising. If it were otherwise, any time a senator, congressman or 
other elected official involved with the passage of a controversial law left office, 
lobbyists and other persons with a vested interest in a particular interpretation of 
that law would solicit former official to submit an affidavit setting forth the view 
of the statute they espoused. The biggest flaw in Snowbird's use of this Affidavit, 
however, is that Finlinson's statements conflict with the rulings of this Court. 
Although Finlinson says that the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act was not 
intended to define and allocate duties of care between ski resorts and downhill 
skiers, this Court has held otherwise. In Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037 (Utah 1991), this Court held that this Act defined the duties that ski area 
operators owed to their patrons. {Id. at 1045-46). Snowbird cannot change that 
decision with Finlinson's Affidavit. But that is not to say that Finlinson's Affidavit 
is totally without evidentiary value. 
It is an admission. The fact that Snowbird attempts with the Finlinson 
Affidavit to overcome the legislative history cited by Rothstein does in fact support 
the conclusion that the purpose of the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act was to define and 
allocate the duty of care required of those who operate ski areas and their patrons. 
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Thus, Release and Indemnity Agreements of the type asserted by Snowbird in the 
instant case would be against that Utah Inherent Risk of Skiing Act's public policy. 
Next, Snowbird focuses upon the factual issues in dispute between the 
parties, such as a claim that the Fluffy Bunny Ski Run on which Rothstein was 
injured was pemianently closed by an orange flag roped-line used for warning and 
skier awareness purposes. {Snowbird Memorandum, p. 3.) Snowbird does this by 
reference to Affidavits from its personnel. But such statements are not supported by 
the photographs of the ski patrolmen working to save Rothstein's life included in 
the Addendum to Rothstein's opening Memorandum, nor are they supported by 
Rothstein's testimony that it was an open run: 
Q: And, again, why did you say this is an open run? 
A: Well, there is nothing marking it closed for a large 
portion - on a Cat track. It's marked open to ski. 
There is no indication whatsoever not to ski down that? 
Q: There was some discussion about whether the Fluffy 
Bunny Run should have been, "marked better." Was it 
marked at all? 
A: It just an open run. 
Q: So that would be, "no?" 
A: It wasn't marked at all. 
Q: Weren't you a little bit embarrassed to be skiing a run 
called Fluffy Bunny? 
A: I am now.1 
(Rothstem Depo. pp. 184 and 185, R. 59.) 
Another point Snowbird attempts to make in its Opposition Memorandum is 
that Rothstein did not have to ski and, in any event, could have skied without 
signing a release agreement. According to Snowbird, Rothstein could have skied 
at Snowbird on a day pass or he could have purchased a 2002 - 2003 season's pass 
from Park City resorts without signing a release. This, too, is a matter of factual 
dispute. Rothstein testified that he was required to sign similar releases when he 
purchased season's passes at Park City, Deer Valley and The Canyons. 
Q: Had you signed any other release prior to the Release 
you signed when you purchased the Seven Summits 
Pass? . . . 
A: I think what you mean is every time I bought a 
season's pass at a ski resort I have signed a similar 
Release. 
Q: Okay. And which other resorts have you purchased a 
season's pass at besides the Seven Summits one for the 
2002-2003 at Snowbird? 
A: Park City, Deer Valley and The Canyons. 
1
 Snowbird's claim that the Fluffy Bunny Run was closed to Rothstein and other 
skiers that day is also inconsistent with the District Court's statement that: 'Tor purposes 
of these motions, I am assuming that this accident happened just the way Mr. Rothstein 
claims that it happened." (Transcript of December 13, 2005 hearing, R. 445, p. 2.) It is 
similarly inconsistent with the law with respect to disputes of fact on Motions for 
Summary Judgment, which must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See 
Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
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Q: And which years did you buy season passes when you 
signed releases at those three resorts. 
A: During my tenure in Park City, which is 15 years, I 
have purchased all three - four of these resorts, 
Snowbird, Canyons and Deer Valley. 
(Rothstein Depo., pp. 51-52, R. 223.) What is not in dispute, however, is that 
Snowbird has never sold, given or provided a season's pass to anyone without 
requiring the signing of a Release Agreement. (R. 393.) Also undisputed is the 
fact that all of the Salt Lake County ski resorts require similar Release and 
Indemnity Agreements from season's pass holders. (R. 327.)2 
The fourth point to be noted about Snowbird's Memorandum is that it refers 
the Court to a number of cases which uphold similar Release and Indemnity 
Agreements in a recreational context. This authority was apparently gathered by 
Snowbird from: Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Validity, Construction and the Effect 
of Agreement Exempting Operator of Amusement Facility From Liability for 
Personal Injury or Death of Patron, 54 ALR 5th 513 (1997) More importantly, 
these cases are not from states having the equivalent of Utah's Inherent Risk of 
Skiing Act and they typically involve accidents or injuries that are inherent to that 
2
 If the Court upholds Snowbird's Release and Indemnity Agreement, it is safe to 
say that to the extent they do not already do so, all 13 of the downhill ski resorts in the 
State of Utah will impose similar Releases upon persons wishing to ski upon the public 
lands of this State. 
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particular recreational activity.5 None of the cases relied upon by Snowbird, 
however, involve anything like the construction of the following mammoth 
retaining wall across a ski run that was snow covered and unmarked when 
Rothstein skied into the structure: 
3
 See e.g. Milligan v. Big Valley Corp B/A Grand Targhee Ski Resort, 754 P.2d 
1063 (Wyo. 1988) (ski racer hits tree); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Smith Simkin, 784 P.2d 
781 (Colo. 1989) (rider thrown from horse); Seigneur v. Nat'I Fitness Institute, Inc., 752 
A.2d 631 (M.D. App. 2000) (torn muscle weightlifting); Henderson v. Qwest Expeditions, 
174 S.W. 3d 730 (Tenn. App. 2005) (slip and fall on river rafting trip); Platzer v. 
Mammoth Mtn. Ski Area, 128 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Cal. App. 2002) (fall from chair lift); 
Coates v. Newhal, 236 Ca. Rptr. 181 (Cal. App. 1987) (fall from dirt bike); Allan v. Snow 
Summit, Inc.. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. App. 1996) (skier falling). 
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Nor would anyone in Rothstein's position who signed Snowbird's Release and 
Indemnity Agreements have imagined that such a condition was allowed to exist 
on a ski run, much less that he or she was waiving all right to sue for injuries 
occasioned by skiing into that hidden wall. 
More importantly, when faced with similar injury causing events not 
inherent in the particular recreational activity. Courts do not hesitate to hold 
Release and Indemnity Agreements unenforceable. Compare Garrison v. 
Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd, 559 N.E.2d 187 (111. App. \990)(Release barred 
claim against health club by patron struck by barbell) with Larsen v. Vic Tanny 
International, 474 N.E. 2d 729(111. App. \9%A){Release did not bar patron's claim 
against health club for injuries occasion from inhaling gaseous vapors). See also 
Edwards v. Wilson, 364 S.E. 2d 642 (Ga. App. 1988) {Release not applicable to 
purchaser of pit pass at automobile race who sustained injuries as a result of 
defendant's negligent direction of traffic prior to commencement of race and 
outside of the pit area); Johnson v. Thruway Speedways, Inc., 407 N.Y.S. 2d 81 
(1978) (Release did not bar claim by spectator at an automobile race struck by 
maintenance vehicle and not by a vehicle involved in the race). 
A fifth point to be noted is that Snowbird correctly points out that in 
Hawkins v. Part-B-A Navajo Trails, 37 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Utah 2001), this Court 
stated that it had not yet adopted any specific standard for determining the validity 
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of pre-injury Exculpatory Agreement. But in Hawkins, this Court did note that 
Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 444 (Ca. 1963) sets 
forth standards for detennining whether the public interest in the activity at issue 
warrants an exception to the general rule allowing releases. Id. at 1065. 
Tunkl holds that a Release for future injury is invalid if it shows some or 
all4 of the following: 
[ 1 ] It concerns a business of a type generally thought 
suitable for public regulation. 
[2] The parties seeking exculpation is forming a service of 
great importance to the public, which is often a matter 
of practical necessity for some members of the public. 
[3] The party hold itself out as willing to perform this 
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or 
at least for any member coming within certain 
established standards. 
[4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, and 
the economic setting of the transaction, the party 
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of 
bargaining strength against any member of the public 
who seeks [the party's] service. 
[5] In exercising its superior bargaining power, the party 
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion 
contract of exculpation and makes no provision 
whereby the purchaser may pay additional reasonable 
fees and obtain protection against negligence. 
[6] Finally, a result of the transaction, the person or 
property of the purchaser is placed under the control of 
A
 No one particular factor seems to be controlling. 
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the seller subject to the risk of carelessness by the 
seller [the seller's agents]. 
Id. at 445-446 (footnotes omitted). Rothstein argued in his opening Memorandum 
that all six of the foregoing elements to invalidate the Releases exist in this 
instance. Snowbird disputes this contention. 
Relying upon case law from states with a less significant ski industry such 
as Chauvilier v. Booth Creek Holdings, Inc., 35 P.3d 383 (Wash. App. 2001)/ 
Snowbird insists that recreational activities could never be so essential or of such 
public importance to set aside a pre-injury Release. Rothstein submits, however, 
that the Tunkl factors are flexible so that in applying them Courts can take into 
consideration cultural as well as regional differences in evaluating the public 
importance of a particular activity such as the significance of the ski industry to 
the State of Utah and the people drawn to visit or reside in Utah because of skiing. 
Snowbird's sixth point is that cases like Daulry v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795 
(Vt. 1995) are the minority view while a majority of the jurisdictions hold that 
when it comes to recreational activities, pre-injury Exculpatory Agreements are 
enforceable. Snowbird is partially correct, Dalury is a minority position. It is also 
a decision from the State of Vennont which, like Utah, places great emphasis upon 
A "Google" search under the words "ski Utah", for example, produces over 
130,000 entries whereas a search for "ski Washington" produces only 739! Searches for 
"ski Vermont" and "ski Colorado" produce results similar to "ski Utah", 91,000 and 
156,000, respectively. 
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its skiing industry and also has the equivalent of an Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. 
Rothstein, therefore, submits that Dalury is, in fact, the more persuasive authority. 
As a seventh point, Snowbird insists that Phillip v. Monarch, 668 P.2d 982 
(Colo. App. 1983) which invalidated pre-injury Release Agreements based upon 
the Colorado Ski Safety Act is distinguishable because that Law enumerates a ski 
resort operators duty of care whereas Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act does not. 
Admittedly, the Colorado Ski Safety Act does enumerate duties which ski operators 
owe to patrons and provides that a violation of these duties constitutes negligence. 
The enumerated duties, however, are not exclusive of additional duties owed by 
ski operators under the Colorado Law. Notwithstanding the duties set out in the 
Colorado Ski Safety Act, other common law duties exist as well. See Boyer v. 
Crested Butte Mtn. Resort, 960 P.2d 70, 78 (Colo. 1998); Trigg v. City & Cnty. of 
Denver, 784 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (10th Cir. 1986). Although the Utah Inherent Risk 
of Skiing Act does not set out similar enumerated duties as the Colorado Act, it 
does define and allocate duties of both ski resorl operators and patrons of those 
resorts. In fact, this Court has stated that the Utah Inherent Risk of King Act does 
define a ski resort operator's duty of care. See Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 
P.2d 1037, 1045-46 (Utah 1991). 
Snowbird claims as its eighth point that Colorado courts have retreated 
from or abandoned altogether the holding in Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 
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668 P.2d 982 (Colo. App. 1983), wherein the Colorado Court of Appeals held that 
a preinjury Exculpatory Agreement could not modify the Colorado Safety Act ys 
allocation of duties of care between skiers and ski operators. Snowbird bases this 
contention on the holdings in Bauer v. Aspen Highlands King Corp., 788 F.Supp. 
472 (D. Colo. 1992) and Mincin v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 308 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 
2002). But neither Bauer nor Mincin had anything to do with the Colorado Ski 
Safety Act. Bauer involved a pre-injuiy Release signed in conjunction with renting 
skiing equipment and Mincin involved mountain biking. 
Snowbird's ninth point is that other than Rothstein's near fatal accident, no 
other injuries have occurred in connection with the mine timber cribbing retaining 
built across the Fluffy Bunny Run. This also may or may not be true. But what 
Snowbird neglects to mention is that in 2003 there was a "low snowpack" whereas 
in other years the snow was so deep that the wall could be safely skied over. 
{Rothstein Depo., pp. 121-24, R.54.) Snowbird likewise glosses over the fact that 
its Director of Snow Safety, Dean Cardinale, told Rothstein and Rothsteirrs friend, 
Bradley Sachs, that the retaining wall should have been "marked," that it was 
hazardous and, more importantly, that the accident was Snowbird's fault. (R. 42 
and 57.) 
Snowbird's tenth and final point may be, perhaps, its strongest. Snowbird 
states that despite his near fatal accident and permanent injuries, Rothstein skied 
12 
36 days the following ski season at Snowbird. The significance of this fact is that 
skiing is a passion for some people especially in Utah. Utah is a ski culture, one 
which fosters down-hill skiing and, as a consequence, attracts visitors and 
residents for whom skiing is a quality of life issue. 
NOTWITHSTANDING SNOWBIRD'S ARGUMENTS TO THE 
CONTRARY, STATES WITH A STRONG PUBLIC INTEREST 
IN THE SKI INDUSTRY CONSIDER SIMILAR RELEASE AND 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS TO BE VOID ON THE BASIS OF 
PUBLIC POLICY AND SO SHOULD UTAH 
The case law on the enforceability of pre-injury Releases signed by persons 
engaged in recreational activities has been collected in Anno., 54 ALR 5h 
513(1997). A review of this authority shows that those states such as Vemiont and 
Colorado, which foster and promote their ski industry as part of their culture, have 
laws similar to Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act and based upon those laws these 
States do not enforce pre-injury Releases. A review of this authority also shows 
that those states without a similar ski culture or similar laws defining the duty of 
care ski resorts owe to their patrons, typically enforce pre-injury Releases when 
the injury causing event falls within the type of risk inherent to that particular 
recreational activity, but when the injury occurs as a result of some event not 
normally encountered in that activity, pre-injury Releases are not enforced. 
Rothstein submits, therefore, that no jurisdiction would enforce the Releases 
involved in this case which purport to absolve Snowbird from its liability for 
13 
having constructed a massive mine cribbing retaining wall across a ski run without 
marking that hazard or otherwise warning Rothstein and other patrons of the 
presence and potential lethality of this obstacle. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a significant case to the Stale of Utah. How this Court rules on the 
question of whether Release and Indemnity Agreements, such as those required by 
Snowbird as a precondition to the purchase of a season's pass, are enforceable will 
have far reaching ramifications. If the Court upholds such Release and Indemnity 
Agreements there will be little, if any, incentive for ski resort operators to spend 
time and/or resources to make their resorts as safe as possible for patrons, and that 
would be in direct contravention to the stated purpose and objective of the Inherent 
Risk of Skiing Act. This Court, therefore, should reverse or vacate the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment and remand with instructions to allow this 
case to proceed to trial. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2006. 
SUITTER AXLAND 
esse C. Trentadue 
SUITTER AXLAND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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